Explanation: Capability-Gated Execution
Vox introduces a "Capability-Gated" mechanism inside its runtime. Because Vox orchestrates dynamic AI agent routines, the security model must assume that non-deterministic paths may attempt to invoke sensitive operations.
The Execution Sandbox
When an Agent evaluates code, or when the orchestrator mounts an untrusted plugin process, it runs within a restrictive sandbox.
Network Constraints
By default, the global HTTP policy (controlled via vox-reqwest-defaults) denies all outbound connections triggered dynamically inside a sandboxed evaluation context unless explicit hostnames have been whitelisted within the project manifest.
Filesystem Constraints
std.fs targets are strictly bounded to the workspace's %TEMP% alias and sandboxed virtual roots. If an LLM-invoked execution attempts:
// vox:skip
std.fs.read("/etc/passwd")?
The runtime immediately terminates the WASI execution step with a Capability Violation.
Database Constraints
All generated data abstractions via Codex are strongly typed. Agents cannot arbitrarily generate direct db.query("DROP TABLE Users") SQL statements because the db.query raw escape hatch is inherently hidden from the exposed @mcp.tool capability domain by default.
Upgrading Capabilities
If you require an Agent or task to legitimately reach the outside network or modify sensitive tables, you establish explicit boundary @mcp.tool functions that validate inputs using @require and encapsulate the permissioned operation securely.
// vox:skip
@mcp.tool "Upload telemetry data to approved vendor"
@require(auth.is_trusted(caller))
fn upload_telemetry(data: str) -> Result[Unit] {
// This runs in the Trusted context
let res = std.http.post_json("https://trusted-vendor.com/ingest", data)?
return Ok(())
}
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